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Abstract—Jamming attacks target a wireless network creating an 
unwanted denial of service. 5G is vulnerable to these attacks despite 
its resilience prompted by the use of millimeter wave bands. Over the 
last decade, several types of jamming detection techniques have been 
proposed, including fuzzy logic, game theory, channel surfing, and 
time series. Most of these techniques are inefficient in detecting smart 
jammers. Thus, there is a great need for efficient and fast jamming 
detection techniques with high accuracy. In this paper, we compare 
the efficiency of several machine learning models in detecting 
jamming signals. We investigated the types of signal features  that 
identify jamming signals, and generated a large dataset using these 
parameters. Using this dataset, the machine learning algorithms were 
trained, evaluated, and tested. These algorithms are random forest, 
support vector machine, and neural network. The performance of 
these algorithms was evaluated and compared using the probability 
of detection, probability of false alarm, probability of miss detection, 
and accuracy. The simulation results show that jamming detection 
based random forest algorithm can detect jammers with a high 
accuracy, high detection probability and low probability of false 
alarm.  
Keywords—Jamming Attacks; Machine Learning; Random Fores; 
Neural Network; Support Vector Machine, 5G.  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
5G is expected to substitute previous generations of cellular 
networks in the near future, promising higher throughput and lower 
latency [1] thereby enabling applications such as “self-driving” 
cars, Internet of Things, E-health services, augmented reality, and 
smart cities. As a result, billions of wireless devices are expected 
to be connected to the internet. Like the existing networks, 5G is 
vulnerable to the cyber security attacks, including jamming [2] and 
GPS spoofing [3, 4]. It will be enabled by cognitive radio, making 
these networks open to new attacks, including primary user 
emulation attacks [5] and spectrum sensing data falsification [6]. 
Thus, it is important to explore the cybersecurity implications of 
5G systems [7, 8]. Jammers create an unwanted denial of service 
by transmitting radio signals that flood the communication 
channels aiming at decreasing SNR of legitimate users thereby 
interrupting their communication. The attacks can be easily 
launched using software defined radio units such as the GNU radio 
and universal software radio peripherals, which are cheap and 
easily accessible. Jammers can target any particular frequency 
channel with low cost [9]. Jamming attacks can be divided into four 
main types: constant jammers, random jammers, deceptive 
jammers, and reactive jammers. Constant jammers launch an attack 
by transmitting a continuous high-power noise sweeping from a 
channel to another following a fixed strategy and repeating this 
process over time. Random jammers operate randomly and do not 
follow any specific strategy jumping from a channel to another. 
Deceptive jammers send illegitimate packets through the wireless 
channels to keep them busy. Reactive jammers continuously 
monitor the state of the frequency channels and target only the 
channels used for communication [10]. In addition, jammers can 
be classified as: regular or smart. Regular jammers cannot sense 
the ongoing transmitted signals and they all play simultaneously. 
Smart jammers can learn quickly, sense and determine how the 
legitimate users are transmitting their signals and they can update 
their attacks’ strategies or adjust the transmission power to more 
damage the legitimate transmission.  
A number of jamming detection techniques have been proposed 
[11-19]. These techniques can be categorized into two main 
classes: non-machine learning [11-17] and machine learning based 
[18,19]. Non-machine learning methods perform using some 
parameters and strategies including threshold, fuzzy logic, game 
theory, channel surfing, mapping jammed region, and timing 
channel. In [12], the authors developed a time series model in 
which they measured the state of the link over series of time and 
compared it with the past link data to detect the state of the 
communication link. In [13], the authors developed a threshold 
based model using the packet loss, throughput, and message 
invalidation ratio to evaluate the performance of the wireless 
channels in time-critical applications. In [14], the authors proposed 
two timing channel based models for jamming detection. One 
model computes the poor packet delivery ratio based on the 
received signal strength while the second model computes the 
throughput. Based on these two parameters, they were able to 
detect whether the link is attacked or not. In [15], the author 
proposed a fuzzy logic centralized jamming detection technique 
based on the received signal strength, packet delivery ratio, bad 
packet ratio, and channel clear assessment parameters. This model 
also developed a base station to run the detection algorithm which 
computes the packet delivery to packet received ratio and the signal 
to noise ratio from the received data to determine the duration of 
this attack [16, 17].                                                                                                                                       
 Machine learning methods are based on classifiers like neural 
networks and support vector machine with different features to 
detect jamming attacks. For instance, the authors of [18] proposed 
an artificial neural network based algorithm for cyclic spectral 
analysis and wideband spectrum sensing. Based on the signal 
quality and the modulation, the algorithm distinguishes the 
jamming signals from the narrowband signals. In [19], the authors 
designed a machine learning based jamming detection system via 
support vector machine, adaptive boosting, and expectation 
maximization algorithms. Noise, busy channel ratio, packet 
delivery ratio, and maximum inactive time were used to detect  
jamming attacks. Most of the previously mentioned techniques 
[11-19] require more resources and ultimately serve only as a 
stopgap. They can detect the state of the link as down, but often 
they cannot identify the source of the outage of the service. In 
addition, these techniques have relatively high probability of false 
alarm. They need accurate algorithms for training and testing the 
classification models. Features selection and learning curves are 
often neglected while they are one of the most important processes 
in designing detection techniques with machine learning. Thus, 
there is a great need for efficient and fast detection techniques able 
to detect jamming attacks more accurately.  
In this paper, we propose using machine learning to detect the 
transmission link state between a transmitter and a receiver to 
verify if it is attacked. Machine learning based models can achieve 
high detection accuracy if the following steps are carefully 
considered: selecting appropriate input features, measuring, 
collecting, building a large dataset, and using accurate 
methodology to train, validate, and test the model. Features and 
parameters used to detect jamming attacks are: bad packet ratio, 
packet delivery ratio, received signal strength, and clear channel 
assessment. We investigated techniques of selecting appropriate 
features and assessing the communication link status. We built a 
large dataset to train, validate, and test machine learning models. 
Randomization and normalization of the dataset and cross-
validation techniques were performed to avoid the problem of 
underfitting. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
II describes the jamming attack model and its classification 
features. Section III discusses the simulation results. Finally, a 
conclusion is given at the end.  
II. METHODOLOGY 
The jamming attacks detection in this paper is formulated as a 
classification problem in which the classifier has to choose 
between two states: the link is lost because of a jammer or the link 
is lost because of another reason. The reason behind using machine 
learning theory to solve this problem is the success of this theory 
to deal with complex problems within an acceptable time and using 
reasonable resources. Designing a successful machine learning 
algorithm requires the selection of appropriate features. In this 
work, several features were selected to identify the presence of 
jamming attacks . Using one parameter only is not  enough to detect 
if there is a jamming attack. In addition, it can be complicated to 
find analytic relations between these parameters and the status of 
the link. For these reasons, machine learning theory is used to find 
an empiric relation among these four metrics in order to detect 
jamming attacks.  
In this section, we describe the jamming attack model used, the 
feature selection and the four parameters used to detect jamming 
attacks. Next, we describe the machine learning techniques used, 
which are random forest, support vector machine with different 
kernels, and neural networks. 
A. Jamming attacks model 
Jamming attacks target both physical layer and cross-layer of 
the wireless networks [20]. Under these attacks, the desired 
communication between a transmitter at location A and a receiver 
at location B is interrupted by the jamming signals which keep the 
channel busy. When the jamming signals occupy the channel for a 
longer period of time, they can create a denial of service [21]. If 
the desired signal, at location A, is denoted by 𝑥(𝑡) and the 
received signal, at location B, is denoted by 𝑦(𝑡), then this 
received signal at the location B, in the absence of the jammer 
signal, is given by  
         𝑦(𝑡) = 𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑛(𝑡)          (1) 
where 𝑥(𝑡) is the desired signal , 𝑦(𝑡) is the received signal, and 𝑛(𝑡) is an additive white Gaussian noise present within the path 
between the transmitter and the receiver. The jammers can 
counterfeit the desired signals creating a signal denoted	𝑥*(𝑡) to 
flood the channel. The receive signal at location B, in the presence 
of the jammer signal, is then given as: 𝑦(𝑡) = 𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑥*(𝑡) + 𝑛	(𝑡) + 𝑛+(𝑡)       (2) 
where 𝑥*(𝑡) is the jammer signal and 𝑛+(𝑡) is the noise within the 
path between the receiver and the jammer’s location. Thus, the 
jamming detection problem can be stated as a hypothesis, in which 
the receiver has to choose between two states, 𝐻- and 𝐻.. 𝐻- is 
the state where the received signal is not jammed, while 𝐻. is the 
state where the received signal is jammed. This problem thus can 
be expressed as a classification problem, in which the machine 
learning classifier has to attribute the incoming signal into one of 
the two classes: the received signal is the desired signal, class A, 
or the received signal is a jamming signal, class B. 
B. Feature selection 
Parameters used to detect jamming attacks are bad packet ratio, 
packet delivery ratio, received signal strength, and clear channel 
assessment. The reason behind using these four parameters is that 
all communication systems are equipped with network interface 
cards that possess diagnostic mechanisms which allow the 
estimation of these metrics [22-26].  
Bad packet ratio is one of the most important parameters to 
detect jamming attacks. It refers to the percentage of incorrect 
packages received [23]. It can be measured at the receiver end and 
is expressed as 
    𝑃𝑅 = 123456	78	56679572:	65;5<=5>	?.;@.A5:B7C.D	923456	78	65;5<=5>	?.;@.A5:        (3) 
 The receivers compute this bad packet ratio by verifying the 
frame check sequence of the incoming packets at the medium 
access control level. If the channel is under any kind of attack, the 
bad packet ratio increases while it is very low when the link status 
is good for transmission. The packet delivery ratio refers to the 
percentage of correctly delivered packages. It is measured at the 
transmitter end and expressed as 𝑃𝐷𝑅 = 123456	78	?.;@.A5	>5D5=<65F	;7665;CDFB7C.D	923456	78	C6.9:3<CC5>	?.;@.A5:       (4) 
The receiver sends back an acknowledgment packet to the 
transmitter each time it receives a correct packet. The packet 
delivery ratio is very high when the link status is good while its 
value decreases exponentially if the link is under any attack. The 
clear channel assessment can be used to measure the number of 
transmitter’s attempts to send a package and the channel is found 
to be occupied. The value of this parameter increases if the channel 
is under jamming attacks.  
The received signal strength, RSS, measures the surrounding 
power of the receiver. It is high when there is no attack; however, 
it decreases if the channel is under any kind of attack. RSS at the 
receiver can be expressed as 
        𝑅𝑆𝑆 = HI∗KI∗KL∗(MCN∗M6N)>O           (5) 
where 𝑃C is the transmitter signal power, 𝐺C	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝐺6 is the gain of 
the antenna at transmitter and receiver respectively, ℎ𝑡	and	ℎ𝑟	are 
the height of antenna at transmitter and receiver, and d is the 
distance between transmitter and receiver. Equation (20) is 
expressed as 																																															𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 𝐾 HI>O                    (6) 
where 𝑘 is a constant such that 𝑘 = 	𝐺C ∗ 𝐺6 ∗ (ℎ𝑡Z ∗ ℎ𝑟Z).	 
C. Machine Learning Algorithms  
A description of each of the machine learning algorithms is 
given below.  
1) Random forest 
 Random forest is a hierarchical classifier method composed of 
a large number of decision trees. In this approach, the test data is 
classified by sorting trees based on their feature values. Each 
decision tree consists of one node and several branches. The 
decision node is the feature of the test data to be classified, and the 
branches represent a value that the node can predict. The reason 
behind using a large number of trees is to avoid the problem of 
overfitting. System variance is reduced, which eventually increases 
the performance of the final model. Basic parameters to random 
forest classifier can be the total number of trees to be generated and 
decision tree related parameters like minimum split, and split 
criteria. Random forest is a predictor that collects the information 
from each tree	{𝑟9(𝑥, 𝜃3, 𝐷9,𝑚 ≥ 1)}, where 𝜃+, 𝜃Z … . 𝜃3 are the 
output of each random trees. These trees are combined to form the 
aggregated estimation to train the forest using: 
      𝑟9d(𝑋, 𝐷9) = 𝐸g[𝑟9(𝑋, 𝜃, 𝐷9)]       (7) 
where 𝐸𝜃 is the expectation with respect to the random 
parameter, conditionally, on 𝑋 and the data set 𝐷9. Once the 
forest is trained, each tree can predict independently to output 
values using the following equation: 
       f9*(𝑥) = +1k(lm(n)) ∑ 𝑌<qr∈lm(n)tru5         (8) 
where 𝑥 is the query point of each tree. The forest averages the 
predictions of each tree to get the final value: f9(v)(𝑥) = +v∑ 𝑓9*(𝑥)v*u+        (9) 
where 𝐴9(𝑥) is the leaf containing 𝑥 and 𝑁5(𝐴9(𝑥)) is the number 
of estimation points it contains. For the binary classification using 
random forest, random response 𝑌 takes only two values in {0, 1}.  
Given	𝑋, random forest has to attribute 0 or 1 to 𝑌. Random forest 
is based on Borel classification measurable rule 𝑚9, which is used 
to estimate the label of 𝑌 from 𝑥 and 𝐷9	where the classifier 𝑚9 
is consistent if its conditional probability of error is low which can 
be expressed as follow 𝐿(𝑚9) = 𝑃{𝑚9(𝑋) ≠ 𝑌[𝐷9]}         (10) 𝐿(𝑚9) = 𝑃[𝑚9(𝑋) ≠ 𝑌[𝐷9]]       (11) 
where 𝐿∗ is the error of the optimal but unknown and 𝐸 is the 
expectations with respect to the random parameter 𝜃. After that 
Bayes classifier is used to get the output for both 0 and 1. 𝑚∗(𝑥) = ~1, 𝑖𝑓		𝑃[𝑌 = 1, 𝑋 = 𝑥] > [𝑌 = 0, 𝑋 = 𝑥 < 0]0, 	𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.        (12) 
In the classification situation where the dataset is divided into 
several classes based on the input parameters threshold values, the 
random forest classifier is obtained via a majority vote among the 
classification trees, that is  𝑚v,9𝑥;	𝜃+ … . 𝜃3,𝐷9 = 1, 𝑖𝑓		 +v ∑ 𝑚9𝑥; 𝜃*, 𝐷9v*u+ > 1/2]0, 	𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.																																(13)  
where n is the number of trees and M tends to infinity number of 
trees. Based on the majority votes, the output is classified as 1 or 
0. If  more than 50% of the total trees vote for 1 then the final 
prediction of random forest is 1 and if more than 50% of the total 
trees vote for 0 then the final prediction of random forest is 
considered as 0.  
2) Support vector machine 
Support vector machine creates a hyperplane to separate data 
into two classes. The choice of the kernel determines the separation 
boundary between the two classes. Different kernels can be used 
 with this model such as linear kernel, radial basis function, 
quadratic, and cubic kernels. The linear kernel is defined as: 
        𝐾(𝑥) = wB𝑥 + 𝑏          (14) 
Linear support vector machine is formulated as solving an 
optimization problem as: min∈‖𝑤‖Z + 𝐶∑ max	(0,1 − 𝑦<𝐾(𝑥<))1<      (15) 
Quadratic and cubic kernels are polynomial kernels with degrees 
of 2 and 3, respectively. Polynomials kernels are defined as: 𝐾(𝑥, 𝑦) = (𝑥. 𝑦 + 1)>        (16) 
where x and y are vectors of features and d is the degree of the 
polynomial. Radial basis function kernel is defined as: 
        K(x, y) = exp	(−γ‖x − y‖Z)       (17) 
3)   Neural Network 
 A neural network is a biological-inspired programming 
paradigm, which enables a machine to learn from observational 
data. This network has shown a great ability to learn and solve 
various problems in different research areas such as image 
processing, signal processing, and wireless communication. A 
neural network consists of one input layer, one or several hidden 
layers, and an output layer. Each layer consists of either one or 
several neurons. A neuron consists of an activation function and 
several links connecting them to other neurons in different layers. 
An initial weight is associated with each link and the neural 
network in the learning phase try to find the set of optimal weight 
that minimizes the error between the hypothesis function and the 
given dataset labels. Each neural network consists of two main 
concepts, which are the forward propagation and backpropagation. 
Forward propagation is the simplest type of artificial neural 
networks where the information moves in only one direction, from 
input to the output through hidden layers. Input features can be 
denoted as 𝑥+, 𝑥Z … . 𝑥9 and the input layer can be summarized by 
the following equations: 
         𝑎(*)(<) = 𝑥<            (18) 
where 𝑎(*)(<)  is the input layer and 𝑥< is the input features. Input layer 
is connected with the hidden layers which can be denoted as 
follows: In the ith hidden layer, we have 																																												𝑧(<) = 𝜃(<)𝑎(<)             (19) 
where 𝑧(<) is the hidden neuron, 𝜃(<) is each layer matrix weight, 
and 𝑎(<) is the hidden layer for the ith hidden layer. The final layer 
is the output layer which can be denoted as:   𝑎(<) = 𝑔(𝑧(<))                   (20)                                   
 
Neural network cost function is used to find out the optimal 
output based on different number of layers and neurons. It is 
expressed by: 
𝐽(𝜃) = − +3∑ ∑ [𝑦@(<)log	(ℎg𝑥(<))@ + 1 −@@u+3<u+𝑦@(<) log1 − ℎg𝑥(<))@} + ¤	Z3 ∑ ∑ ∑ (𝜃*,<(D))Z:¥¦§*u+:¥<u+¨©+Du+     (21) 
where 𝐽(𝜃) is the cost function, ℎg is the hypothesis function, and λ	 is the regularization factor. Regularization cost function is used 
to reduce the effect of over bias and under bias by regularization 
factor (λ) 𝐽(𝜃) = +3∑ ∑ [−𝑦@(<)log	(ℎg𝑥(<))@ − 1 −@@u+3<u+𝑦@(<) log1 − ℎg𝑥(<))@} + ¤	Z3 [∑ ∑ (𝜃*,@(+))Z +:¥<u+¨©+Du+∑ ∑ (𝜃*,@(Z))Z:D@u+*¨u+ ]                                                            (22)  
where the regularization factor λ	is used to reduce the effect of the 
over bias and under bias. Neural networks use different 
optimization techniques such as Adam, gradient descent, and 
stochastic gradient descent to minimize the cost function. At the 
output layer, neural network uses a sigmoid function to attribute 
the new dataset into one of the two classes, in the case of binary 
classification, by calculating the hypothesis using the weights 
determined in the leaning parts. If this hypothesis is greater than 
0.5, than it concludes that “y=1”; otherwise “y=0”. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
To validate the machine learning models, four different 
parameters were used as features to detect jamming attacks. A real 
environment simulation was performed to collect measurements of 
these parameters in the two scenarios: link is under attack and link 
under no attack. To train and test the models, the dataset was 
divided into N folds using the cross-validation technique. N-fold 
cross-validation was used to divide the dataset into N number of 
subsamples with equal size. In this work, machines learning 
algorithms were trained with a different number of fold sizes such 
as 2, 5, 10, and 20 to evaluate the performance of these machines 
for the given dataset.  For instance, if the number of folds is 10, 
then the total data is divided into 10 folds and randomly the 
algorithm selects 9 folds to train the model and 1 fold is used to test 
the machine. This process is repeated until the dataset is tested on 
the 10 folds. To evaluate the performance of the classifiers, several 
metrics were used, namely probabilities of detection, false alarm, 
miss detection, and accuracy. Pd refers to the likelihood that the 
detection technique attributes signals coming from a jammer to the 
class of jamming signals meaning that it correctly detects that the 
link is under a jamming attack  
     𝑃> = «¬­®¯°	±²	³°¬´µ	¶¯³¯·³¯¶	¸³³¸·¹º	»±³¸´	¼¬­®¯°	±²	¸³³¸·¹º                  (23) 
Pmd is the percentage of attacks that the algorithm miss detected. 
It is given by: 𝑃3 = 	«¬­®¯°	±²	­½ºº	¶¯³¯·³¯¶	¸³³¸·¹º»±³¸´	¼¬­®¯°	±²	¸³³¸·¹º               (24) 
Pfa is the percentage of non-attacks that the algorithm detected as 
attacks   𝑃8. = «¬­®¯°	±²	¼±¼©¸³³¸·¹º	¶¯³¯·³¯¶	¸º	¸¼	¸³³¸·¹»±³¸´	¼¬­®¯°	±²	¼±¼©¸³³¸·¹º       (25) 
 Accuracy gives the total number of attacks and non-attacks that 
are detected accurately compared to the total number of trials. It 
is given by: 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 = 	»±³¸´	¼¬­®¯°	±²	·±°°¯·³´µ	¶¯³¯·³¯¶	¸³³¸·¹	¸¼¶	¼±¼©¸³³¸·¹	³°½¸´ºB7C.D	923456	78	C6<.D:      (26) 
We conducted several experiments and examples of results are 
given from Fig. 1 to Fig. 4. Fig. 1 shows the accuracy of the 
classification using random forest versus the number of estimators 
for a different number of folds in the cross-validation. It can be 
seen from this figure that for all values of K-folds, 5, 10, and 20, 
the accuracy of the classification is exponentially increasing as a 
function of the number of estimators, for numbers of estimators 
less than 60. However, this accuracy remains slightly constant for 
numbers higher than 60 and in some cases, it drops. This figure 
also shows the impact of the number of folds on the accuracy. One 
can see that with 20 folds, the accuracy is higher than the one with 
10 and 5 folds.  
 
Fig. 1. Accuracy versus the number of estimators for random forest using 
different number of k-folds cross validation CV=5, 10, and 20. 
To select the best support vector model, we investigated how 
the accuracy varies for different kernels and regularization 
parameter C in order to select the best combination for this given 
dataset. Fig. 2 shows the accuracy of the classification function of 
the regularization factor “C” for linear, quadratic, cubic, radial 
basis function, and sigmoid kernels. From this figure, it can be seen 
that the impact of the regularization factor “C” does not change the 
accuracy very much. However, as one can see the choice of the 
kernel impacts the accuracy. The accuracy is high for radial basis 
function kernel, followed by linear, cubic, sigmoid, and then 
quadratic kernels. Support vector machine with radial basis 
function and regularization factor equal to 3 has the highest 
accuracy of 94%. 
 
Fig. 2. Accuracy Vs regularization factor for support vector machine.  
Fig. 3 shows the accuracy of the classification function of the 
number of hidden neurons in one hidden layer of neural network 
for a different number of k-folds cross-validation. One can observe 
that the impact of the number of hidden neurons and the number of 
cross-validation technique is not significant as the accuracy of the 
classification remains around 94%, but the highest one is achieved 
with 1 neuron with 5-folds cross-validation and with 100 neurons 
with 10-folds cross-validation.  
 
Fig. 3. Accuracy of neural network Vs number of neurons in one hidden layer.  
Fig. 4 shows Pd Vs Pfa using linear, polynomial with degree 2, 
radial basis function SVM, neural network with two hidden layers 
of 2 neurons each, and random forest with 100 estimators. One can 
see that Pd increases as Pfa increases. In addition, it can be observed 
that random forest has the higher ROC followed by radial basis 
function SVM, cubic SVM, linear SVM, and then the neural 
network which means that random forest outperforms other 
algorithms regarding the ROC curve. 
 
Fig. 4. Probability of detection Vs the probability of false alarm.  
Table I compares the performance of the jamming detection 
techniques based on machine learning classifiers for the four 
evaluation metrics. Random forest achieves the highest probability 
of detection with 97.5 %, followed by cubic SVM with 97.1%, 
neural network with 96.4%, linear SVM with 86.9%, RBF SVM 
with 86.2%, sigmoid SVM with 73.8%, and quadratic SVM with 
72 %. It can also be seen that random forest has the lowest 
probabilities of false alarm of 5.6%, followed by neural network 
with 11.1%, RBF SVM with 27.2%, linear SVM with 27.25%, 
sigmoid SVM with 40.1%, cubic SVM with 54%, and quadratic 
SVM with 65.2%. This table shows also that random forest has the 
 lowest miss detection with 2.5%, followed by cubic SVM with 
2.9%, neural network with 3.6%, linear SVM with 13.1%, RBF 
SVM with 13.8%, sigmoid SVM with 26.22%, and quadratic SVM 
with 28%. In terms of accuracy, random forest has an accuracy as 
high as 96.6% followed by neural network with 94.4%, RBF SVM 
with 84.7%, linear SVM with 83%, sigmoid SVM with 82.6%, 
cubic SVM 70.1%, quadratic SVM with 62%. 
TABLE I.  PERFORMANCE COMPARISON  
Classification 
technique 
Pd (%) Pfa (%) Pmd (%) Accuracy (%) 
Linear SVM 86.9 27.25 13.1 83 
Quadratic SVM 72 65.2 28 62 
Cubic SVM 97.1 54 2.9 70.1 
RBF SVM 86.2 27.2 13.8 84.7 
Sigmoid SVM 73.8 40.1 26.22 82.6 
Neural network 96.4 11.1 3.6 94.4 
Random Forest 
estimators = 100 
97.5 5.6 2.5 96.6 
CONCLUSION 
5G technology is designed to be resilient to jamming attacks by 
using millimeter wave band. However, it is also designed to use 
frequencies below 6 GHz, which are easy to target by jammers. 
Smart jamming detection techniques are required to prevent these 
attacks. In this paper, we reviewed the existing jamming detection 
techniques. We investigated and compared the performance of 
several machine learning models to detect jamming attacks. 
Feature extraction and feature selection were performed and a large 
dataset was constructed to train, validate, and teste random forest, 
support vector machine, and neural network algorithms. We used 
a cross-validation technique and provided learning curves to 
evaluate the performance of these models based on a number of 
metrics. The results show that random forest based technique 
detects jamming attacks with a very high accuracy and a low cost. 
Pd of random forest based detection is as high as 97.5% whereas 
Pfa of the neural network and cubic support vector machine is 
around 96.4% and 97.1%. Pmd  and Pfa of random forest are also 
very low compared to neural network and cubic support vector 
machine which are 5.6% and 2.5%. High Pd and low Pfa make this 
proposed model suitable for jamming attack detection. These 
trained machines are able to process a huge number of data within 
a very short time, which helps increase efficiency and reduce the 
processing time. Future work includes investigating the efficiency 
of deep learning in detecting all types of jamming attacks. 
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